

QUESTIONS ON PORPHYRY'S ISAGOGE, QQ. 1-3

DUNS SCOTUS

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[QUESTION 1: WHETHER LOGIC IS A SCIENCE]

1. We ask whether logic is a science.

It seems *not*:

For a manner of knowing (*modus sciendi*) is not itself a science (*scientia*); logic is a manner of knowing. Therefore, etc. The major is evident by analogy: the manner of seeing is not sight. The proof of the minor is from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* II¹ “It is absurd to seek at once both the knowledge and the manner of knowing it.” And this is explained [thus]: 'manner of knowing', i.e. 'logic'².

2. Again, in *Metaphysics* VI³ Aristotle divides the sciences into the mathematical, natural, and divine or metaphysical, and logic is contained under none of these.
3. Again, a science is from what is proper to it, just as a demonstration is according to Aristotle in *Posterior Analytics* I⁴; logic is from what is common⁵; therefore, etc.
4. **For the opposite:**
Knowledge (*scientia*) is the effect of a demonstration; But in logic, many things are shown by demonstration; therefore, etc.
5. Again, the following is *per se*: 'the logician is knowing' (*logicus est sciens*), therefore, logic is a science; for when the predication is *per se*, what holds for the particular also holds in the abstract.
6. **We must say that** logic is a science, for the things taught in it are concluded by demonstration just as in other sciences; therefore they are known (*sciuntur*), since “a demonstration is a syllogism effecting knowledge⁶”. There are likewise in logic all the things required for demonstration: that is, a subject, [and] a datum (*passio*) demonstrable from that subject through a medium – that is, a definition.
7. But we must recognize that logic is considered in two ways⁷: one, as *teaching* (*docens*), and thus it proceeds from necessary and proper principles to necessary conclusions, and is a science; the other, as we *use* logic, applying it to those areas where it has use, and thus it is not from proper but common [principles] – as happens plainly in the natural [sphere], where Aristotle⁸ brings forth logical reasons that proceed from a common medium but do not, properly speaking, bring about knowledge.

¹Aristot., *Metaph.* II t. 15 (AL XXV² 39-40; a c. 3, 995a 14-15): “...and it is absurd to seek at once both the knowledge and the mode (*modus*) of knowledge”.

²Averroës, *Metaph.* II com. 15 (f. 17rb): “And [Aristotle] said this because the logical art is in a way universal to all sciences, and in a way proper to each science. And man cannot be instructed in any art without knowing both what is universal and what is proper to it. And when he said this, he gave a very useful maxim, and it is as though a man would co-learn [logic] in connection with the other sciences. For then he will learn neither [the science] nor [logic], just as he said: 'for it is bad to seek some science and the manner according to which it is put forth'”.

³Aristot., *Metaph.* VI t. 2 (AL XXV² 117-118; E c. 1, 1026a 18-19): “Wherefore there will be three [kinds of] theoretical philosophy: mathematics, physics, theology...”

⁴Aristot., *Anal. Post.* I c. 9-10 (AL IV⁴ 295-296; A c. 9-10, 76a 17-b 16).

⁵Aegidius Rom., *Anal. Post.* Prologue (ed. Venice 1520, f. 5ra D): “Inasmuch, then, as logic is considered as teaching (*docens*), and inasmuch as it brings forth necessary reasons in this manner (for not every necessary reason is a demonstration, but only that which proceeds from what is proper to a given discipline and engenders knowledge in us) the reasons it transmits to us as teaching and as handing on the art of demonstrating and syllogizing ought not be called demonstrations, unless perhaps we were to take 'demonstration' in a wide sense for 'any necessary reason': both because reasons of this kind proceed from certain common [notions]; and because they do not generate *knowledge* in all, but rather the mode of knowing...”

⁶Aristot., *Anal. Post.* I c. 2 (AL IV² 113; A c. 2, 71b 18-20): “I call a syllogism effecting knowledge a demonstration”; *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. J. Hamesse p. 312): “A demonstration is a syllogism making us know what we know when we have a demonstration”.

⁷Cf. Lambertus de Latiniaco (Lambertus Altissiodorensis attr.), *Summa logicae* c. 1 (ed. F. Alessio p. 5): For logic is a science teaching about all syllogisms... Likewise, the art of logic makes use of all syllogisms...”

⁸Aristot., *Physica* I t. 8 (AL VII¹ 9; A c. 2, 184b 25-185a 4)

8. **To the first**⁹ we say¹⁰ that the manner of knowing is not a special science; but it can be a common one.
9. **On the contrary:** if the following is true in any way “the manner of knowing is knowledge” then, since the predication is in the abstract, it will be [true] *per se* and in the first way. The consequent is false, therefore also the antecedent. The consequence is evident because every predication in the abstract is essentially true. The falsity of the consequent is evident because the predicate is not included in the notion of the subject.
10. Again, the manner of knowing is posterior to knowing; therefore, it is posterior to knowledge (*scientia*), for knowing is posterior to knowledge.
11. So we instead say that formally speaking, the minor¹¹ is false.
12. <Or we could say that the major¹² is false, since there is a true knowledge of the manner of knowing. Hence, the intellect understands the object about which it has knowledge; and again, it can acquire knowledge for itself of its act of understanding by reflection.>
13. For proof¹³ we can say that the the exposition ought to be understood materially; and thus, this predication 'the manner of knowing is knowledge' is true, since logic teaches the manner of knowing inasmuch as it treats of syllogism or argument, by which we have knowledge.
14. We could also say that if by 'manner of knowing' we understand 'logic', the copula ought not to fall between 'knowledge' and 'manner of knowing', but between 'to seek the knowledge' and 'to seek the manner of knowing it'. For to seek this is to seek the other concomitantly, just as to seek anything is to seek whatever is necessarily connected to it, even though [the search for] the one is not abandoned.
15. **To the second**¹⁴ I say that in that place, [Aristotle] is distinguishing real sciences; whereas logic is a rational [science]¹⁵.
16. **To the third**¹⁶ it is clear that logic discloses its properties (*passiones*) by its proper principles, though its use concerns common things¹⁷.

⁹Cf. n. 1 above.

¹⁰**Robertus Kilwardby**, *Anal. Priora* (ed. Venetiis 1499 f. 1ra): “And so in the end it is doubtful for what reason we do not call the special sciences arts of invention and judgment, as we do logic. And we must say that it is unfitting to seek at once both the science and the manner of knowing it. Now the specific content [of a special science] determines the science itself, for which reason it will *not* determine the manner of knowing it. But the manner of knowing consists in finding (*inveniendo*) and judging, for which reason the manner of finding and judging need not be determined by any special science; and so it will be determined in logic, which is a common science”.

¹¹Sc., 'logic is a manner of knowing'; cf. n. 1 above.

¹²Viz., 'The manner of knowing is not knowledge'; cf. n. 1 above.

¹³Cf. n. 1.

¹⁴Cf. n. 2 above.

¹⁵Cf. **Duns Scotus**, *Metaph.* VI q. 1 n. 43: “We should know (*sciendum est*) that we should understand (*intelligendum est*) 'first' here as pertaining to real speculative science, which considers first intentions abstracted from real singulars and quidditative statements about these. By this we exclude logic, which is concerned with second intentions, which are not predicated quidditatively of any being of first intention”.

¹⁶Cf. n. 3 above.

¹⁷Cf. q. 2.

[QUESTION 2: WHETHER LOGIC IS A COMMON SCIENCE]

1. We ask whether logic is a common science (*scientia communis*).

It seems not:

For the commonality of a science is from the commonality of its subject¹; [but] the subject of logic is distinct from the subjects of other sciences.

2. **The opposite** is argued by Boethius²:

'Logic treats of second intentions applied to first [intentions]'; but these are applicable to *all* first [intentions].

3. **We must say that** a science is called common from its subject. And so 'common' can be understood in two ways: either that the subject is predicable of the subjects of other sciences; or that the subject is used by other sciences.

4. Logic is not common in the first way except perhaps accidentally, if its subject is applicable to all [spheres]. In the second way it is common.

¹Aristot., *Anal. Post.* I c. 28 t. 179 (AL IV² 151; A c. 28, 87a 38-87b 4); cf. Thomas, *Expos. libri Post.* I lect. 20 (I² 75):
“...logic will concern what is common to all, i.e. intentions of reason, which pertain to all things; But it is not that logic has those common reasons themselves as subjects... But even if the part of logic that is demonstrative is turned toward common intentions *qua* teaching (*docendo*), the *use* of a demonstrative science still does not proceed from these common intentions”.

²More likely Avicenna, *Metaph.* I c. 2 (AviL 10): “Intentions understood secondarily (*intentiones intellectae secundo*), which are added to intentions understood firstly (*quae apponuntur intentionibus intellectis primo*), are, as you knew, the subject of logic...”

[QUESTION 3: WHETHER THE SUBJECT OF LOGIC IS THE SYLLOGISM]

1. We ask about subject of logic, whether it be the syllogism.

It seems not:

For all knowledge (*scientia*) is via syllogism. If, then, there is a knowledge of the syllogism, this will be via syllogism. But this is false:

2. Both because the syllogism, which we seek knowledge of, is unknown, whereas the syllogism by which knowledge is had is known; for nothing is known through what is unknown.
3. And because I am searching for a syllogism by which one possesses knowledge: either there is knowledge of this, or there isn't. If there isn't, then by the same reason neither is there [knowledge] of the syllogism in general (*in communi*); for whatever is known of the general [case] is known also for any particular. If there is, then [this will be] through another syllogism, and so we shall proceed to an infinite of syllogisms we'd have to have knowledge of. But this is incongruous, for then none would be known. For, the infinite is unknown, from Aristotle's *Physics I*¹; therefore, the same [thing] is both known and unknown.
4. Again, nothing is the subject of a whole and [its] part; but the syllogism is the subject of a part of logic², sc. the books of the *Prior Analytics*. Therefore, etc.
5. Again, there never was a syllogism in sense, and so neither [is there] in the understanding. The consequence is plain from Aristotle's *On sense and what is sensed*³.
6. **For the opposite:**
In logic, the properties (*passiones*) of the syllogism are shown (*demonstrantur*) principally from itself and from other [things] on account of it (*propter ipsum*). Therefore, etc.⁴.
7. **Some say**⁵ that the subject of logic is the concept formed from the act of reason, since this is common to all the things logic considers. For the act of reason is threefold⁶: first, understanding indivisibles; second, joining or dividing those indivisibles; third, moving discursively from the known to the unknown. On the concept formed from the first act, there is the book of *Categories* which is on what is simple (*incomplexo*); on the concept formed from the second act, there is the book *On interpretation*, which is on the statement (*enunciatione*); on the concept formed by the third act there is the new logic (*logica nova*), which is on the syllogism

¹Aristot., *Physica* I t. 35 (AL VII¹ 19-20; A c. 4 187b 7-8): "So if the infinite, insofar as it is infinite, is unknown..."; Aristot., *Anal. post.* I c. 24 t. 167 (AL IV² 147-48; A c. 24, 86a 5-6): "Now there are [things that are] unknowable insofar as they are infinite; but knowable insofar as they are limited".

²Thomas, *Expos. libri Post.* I proem. (I² 6): "The certainty of a judgment possessed through a resolution is either from the form of the syllogism alone – and the book of the *Prior Analytics*, which treats of the syllogism as such, is ordered toward this...".

³Aristot., *De sensu et sensato* c. 6 (c. 6, 445b 16-17); *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. J. Hamesse p. 197): "Our intellect understands nothing apart from sense".

⁴Cf. Robertus Kilwardby, *De ortu scientiarum* c. 49 (ed. G. Judy p. 160-61): "And so a discourse inquiring after an unknown truth on a general question is a syllogism and its idea (*species*), which logic treats of".

⁵Cf. Thomas, *Expos. libri Post* I proem (I² 4-5): "We ought, then, to admit three parts of logic according to the diversity of the acts of reason. Now there are three acts of reason. The first two of these belong to reason on account of its being a kind of understanding. For one act of understanding is *understanding indivisibles*, or *simples (incomplexorum)*, from which we conceive what a thing is; and this operation is called by some *informing the understanding (informatio intellectus)*, or *imagining through understanding (imaginatio per intellectum)*; and the teaching that is ordered toward this operation of reason is given by Aristotle in the book of *Categories*. While the second operation of understanding is *joining or separating [things] understood (compositio vel divisio intellectuum)*, in which lie truth and falsity; and the teaching dedicated to this act of reason is given by Aristotle in the book *On interpretation*. While the third act of reason is what is proper to reason, sc. moving discursively from one into another, in order to come to recognize what is unknown through what is known; and the remaining books of logic are dedicated to this act".

⁶Cf. Aristot., *De an.* III t. 21 (Γ c. 6, 430a 26-28); *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. J. Hamesse p. 187): "The operation of the intellect is twofold: one [part of] which is called the apprehension of simple terms (*simplicium terminorum apprehensio*); the other, the joining and dividing of simple apprehended terms (*simplicium terminorum apprehensorum compositio et divisio*): under which a third is comprehended, sc. abstract reasoning (*ratiocinatio remota*)".

and its specific parts (*partibus subiectivis*).

8. Others posit that [logic] is concerned with second intentions applied to first [intentions], as Boethius⁷ says that these are common to everything determined in logic.
9. A third answer posits that being (*ens*) is the subject, since in *Metaphysics* IV⁸, Aristotle [states that] the metaphysician, dialectician, and sophist work on the same [subject]; the metaphysician works on being; therefore, etc.
10. A fourth answer posits speech (*oratio*)⁹, since, this being the genus of the statement, the old logic is limited to this [i.e. speech] and its parts; and it is put in the definition of the syllogism in *Prior Analytics* I¹⁰.
11. A fifth answer posits argumentation¹¹, since the whole of logic is concerned with its aspects (*speciebus*) and parts.
12. A sixth answer posits the syllogism¹², since all other things considered in logic are considered for the sake of it.
13. **To see which position** is more true, we must note that three conditions are required of the subject in a science. [The first is] that it is known what it is (*quid est*) and that it is (*quia est*), for these two must be presupposed for demonstration, as is stated in *Posterior Analytics* I¹³. The second is that in that science, the properties (*passiones*) of its subject be demonstrated of it from its quiddity (*quid est*). The third is that everything else determined in the science refers back to it and is considered for its sake. For otherwise, this unity lacking, there would be no unity of the science.
14. The first two conditions are lacking from the first three opinions¹⁴ put forth, since none of these are defined in logic in a general manner (*secundum rationem generalem*), as subjects are put forth. It is neither a prerequisite (*nec praemittitur*) as a principle of knowledge (*scientiae*), nor is any property (*passio*) of these demonstrated in general. Therefore, each of them is too common [to be a] subject. There is even no difference among these three, as is clear of the first and the second. We prove this of the third as well: for the subject here is either real being (*ens reale*) or the being of reason (*ens rationis*). If the first, then the science [itself] is real, which is false. If the second, then it either treats the being of reason alone – that is, what is considered by the intellect – or the being of reason as *caused* by reason. If the first, then it is still would be a real [science]. For nothing is the subject of any science unless it is considered by the intellect or reason, for only as such is it universal. Therefore, it must be granted that it is of being caused by reason, which is the same as the others.
15. To the reason for the first¹⁵, it is plain that the argument is insufficient and commits the fallacy

⁷More likely **Avicenna**, *Metaph.* I c. 2 (AviL 10).

⁸**Aristot.**, *Metaph.* IV t. 5 (AL XXV² 63; Γ c. 2, 1004b 22-23): “For sophistry and dialectics are concerned with the same genus as philosophy is”; the Arabic-Latin translation has: “...for the logician and sophist work on what it befits the philosopher to work on”.

⁹**Boethius**, *In Categ. Aristot.* I (PL 64, 161CD): “Therefore, since every logical art is on speech (*oratione*), and this work principally treats of speaking (*vocibus*)...”

¹⁰**Aristot.**, *Anal. Priora* I c. 1 (AL III¹ 6; A c. 1, 24b 18-20): “Now a syllogism is a speech in which, certain things being posited, something else follows of necessity from what is posited because these things are so”.

¹¹**Albertus M.**, *Liber de praedicabilibus* I c. 4 (ed. Borgnet I 8a): “Argumentation is, then, the proper subject of teaching logic (*logicae docentis*). And this is the judgment of three philosophers, sc. Avicenna, Alfarabi, and Algazel”.

¹²**Albertus M.**, *Liber de praedicabilibus* I c. 4 (ed. Borgnet I 8b): “The whole of logic, then, has argumentation or syllogism as its subject.”; **Thomas**, *Expos. libri Post.* I lect. 20 (I² 75): “For logic considers the syllogism and the statement and the category, or whatever else of this sort, as subjects”.

¹³**Aristot.**, *Anal. post.* I c. 1 (AL IV¹ 5; A c. 1, 71a 11-16); cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. J. Hamesse p. 311): “Here again we hold that in any science we ought to presuppose the existence of its subject (*subiectum esse*), as well as what it might express (*quid significet ipsum*)”.

¹⁴Cf. n. 7-9 above.

¹⁵Cf. n. 7 above.

- of the consequent, since the other two conditions of a subject are lacking.
16. To the authority of Boethius¹⁶ I say that logic is about these, but these are not its main (*primum*) subject, but more common than the subject, just as we say that every science is of being since none is of non-being¹⁷.
 17. To the reason for the third position¹⁸, I say that they work on the same, not because the subject is the same, but because something is considered in logic whereby it happens to work on all things. For many things are worked on in a science, but not because each of those things is the primary (*principale*) subject of the science.
 18. For the fourth [option]¹⁹, sc. speech, the second and third conditions²⁰ are lacking. And when we accept that it belongs to the syllogism, I say that it only equivocally [belongs] to it and the statement; and what is equivocal is not a subject, for neither is it definable; in the definition of the syllogism, it is taken [to mean] 'argument'.
 19. To the fifth [option]²¹, sc. argumentation, the first²² is lacking. For Aristotle never defines argumentation generally (*in communi*), nor does he propose its definition as the principle of the science; rather, Boethius defines it in his *Topics*²³. The second, as is clear from the general reason (*secundum rationem generalem*), is also lacking. Next, I prove the third: for either it is equivocal, and then it is clear that there is not one science from *its* unity, for then neither what is knowable (*scibile*) nor what is intelligible [in the science] is one; or it is analogous to what is contained under it, and then there will not be one science from it, but from the unity of the primary [meaning] to which the others are subordinated (*attribuuntur*), – and this is 'syllogism' – just as the unity of metaphysics is from the unity of substance, to which all other beings are subordinated.
 20. **We must say**, then, that the first and proper subject [of logic] is the syllogism²⁴. It meets the first condition, since immediately after its parts are determined in the old logic (*in veteri logica*), [Aristotle] advances (*praemittit*) its definition at the beginning of the *Prior Analytics*²⁵. And the second, since in the same [work] he demonstrates many properties (*passiones*) of it through that definition – for instance, that mood and figure belong to it essentially (*de inesse*), and in the chapter²⁶ beginning “Since therefore in these”, [he shows] that [every syllogism] has only three terms, from the fact that it must move to a conclusion (*de necessitate accidere conclusioni*), etc²⁷. And the third, since [Aristotle] determines its parts, sc. the simple (*incomplexo*) and the statement and its integral and subjective parts, for the sake of it in the books of the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*; and [he treats of] the other kinds of argumentation because these are reduced to it as the imperfect [is] to the perfect; and of the sophistical

¹⁶Cf. n. 8 above.

¹⁷Cf. **Aristot.**, *Anal. post.* I c. 2 (AL IV¹ 7; A c. 2, 71b 25-26); *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. J. Hamesse p. 312): “...there is no science of non-being”.

¹⁸Cf. n. 9 above.

¹⁹Cf. n. 10 above.

²⁰Cf. n. 13 above.

²¹Cf. n. 11 above.

²²I. e. the first condition; cf. n. 13 above.

²³**Boethius**, *De differentiis topicis* (PL 64, 1180C): “An argument is an account making something uncertain trustworthy (*Argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem*).”

²⁴Cf. n. 12 above.

²⁵**Aristot.**, *Anal. Priora* I c. 1 (AL III¹ 6; A c. 1, 24b 22-24): “I therefore call that syllogism perfect which has need of nothing else besides what are taken up [in it] to make its necessity apparent”.

²⁶**Aristot.**, *Anal. Priora* I c. 23 (AL III³ 228; A c. 23, 40b 17).

²⁷In the exposition of John Foxal we read (f. 65rb): “...‘of necessity (*ex necessitate*) to move to a conclusion’, i.e. that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises”; in the commentary of Mauritius de Portu it has (ed. Vivès I 82a): “And what follows is not there in the text of Aristotle, but is the teaching of the Doctor (*littera Doctoris*) when he states ‘from the fact that it must move to a conclusion’...”.

syllogism, as its privation, since it belongs to the same [science] to investigate [both] the condition (*habitus*) and the privation²⁸. And so it is plain that the divisions of logic are according to the divisions and attributes of [the syllogism].

21. **To the first** argument²⁹: I concede that the science is of the syllogism by a particular syllogism.
22. To the first³⁰ [reason] against this³¹, I say that that syllogism is known as regards the truth of its premises, since these propositions are immediate; and with respect to the conclusion's following from the premises, since this is manifest *per se*, since “a syllogism is perfect which has need of nothing [else] to show itself necessary³²”, i.e. for it to be clear that the conclusion follows from the premises. But this syllogism by which the knowledge (*scientia*) [is acquired] is unknown as a consequence (*quoad passionem*) demonstrated of the syllogism commonly, so as such³³ the syllogism generally (*in communi*) is unknown. For knowledge (*cognitio*) of the syllogism generally is not sought except as a consequence (*quoad passionem*), and so it is not [the case] that the same is both known and unknown in the same [respect] (*secundum idem*).
23. To the other³⁴ [reason] against this, I say that the knowledge (*scientia*) is of the syllogism by which the knowledge is [had]. And when it is asked, ‘through *which* syllogism?’, I say through itself, for inasmuch as any property (*passio*) is shown by it [to hold] of every syllogism, it is shown [to hold] for itself inasmuch as it is a syllogism; nor does knowledge (*scientia*) of the particular occur otherwise”
24. To the second main argument³⁵, I say that the syllogism, with respect to the properties (*proprietates*) formally consequent upon it, is the subject of the books of the *Prior Analytics*. But it is the subject of the whole of logic with respect to *all* of its properties (*passiones*), whether intrinsic (*in se*) or in its integral or subjective parts, or in what is reducible to it. Nor ought we call all things considered in a science [its] subject, but [only] the being (*esse*) for the sake of which the others are considered; as occurs in the subject of natural science – which is the mobile body – where motion and nature, which are not mobile bodies, are still discussed. – Or we can say that the major is false in sciences where the subject of the whole requires many things to be defined (*determinari*) in order to be understood (*propter eius cognitionem*). For then it will be necessary to define those many things in the science, and with this, the subject itself. And this is so, as is plain in the book of the *Physics*, with respect to the whole of natural science³⁶.
25. To the third³⁷ I say that that proposition of Aristotle “there is nothing in the intellect” etc., is true of what is primarily intelligible, which is the quiddity of a material being, but not of all things that are intelligible *per se*; for many things are understood *per se*, not because they form an image in sense, but by the reflection of the intellect; and so it is with the syllogism. “For *per*

²⁸Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. J. Hamesse p. 122. 187): “It belongs to the same science to consider opposites: that is, the teaching of opposites is the same”; “A privation is known through its habit”; see **Aristot.**, *Metaph.* IV t. 4 (AL XXV² 62; Γ c. 2, 1004a 9-10); *Metaph.* V t. 16 (AL XXV² 97; Δ c. 10, 1018a 20-24).

²⁹Cf. n. 1 above.

³⁰Cf. n. 2 above.

³¹I.e. against Scotus' answer in n. 21.

³²Cf. n. 20 above.

³³Sc. as a consequence (*quoad quam passionem*).

³⁴Cf. n. 3 above.

³⁵Cf. n. 4 above.

³⁶Cf. **Aegidius Rom.**, *Physica* prolog. (ed. Venice 1502, f. 2rb): “And since physics is thus essentially concerned with mobile body, we ought to accept, after the division of mobile body, books partially belonging to (*partiales libros*) natural science. For mobile body, as is commonly said, is so simply or by limitation (*contracte*). And so it is defined simply in the book of *Physics*”.

³⁷Cf. n. 5 above; cf. **Aegidius Rom.**, *Anal. Post.* I t. 33 (ed. Venice 1520, f. 62J. 63E): “We must say that nothing is in the intellect that was not first in sense... therefore, sense is in itself the doorway of all learning (*totius cognitionis*)”.

se' extends farther than 'primarily' (*primo*)," as it says in *Prior Analytics* I³⁸. For the isosceles has three [angles] *per se*, but not primarily.

³⁸ **Aristot.**, *Anal. Post.* I c. 4 (AL IV¹ 14; A c. 4, 73b 38-39): "But perhaps the ἰσοσκελὲς certainly has [three angles] equal to two right [angles], but [it does] not [have this] primarily (*primum*); rather, the triangle [has this] primarily".